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Defining Coal Dredging as Surface
Mining Under SMCRA: Cumberland
Reclamation Co. v. United States
STEFAN R. HUGHES*
INTRODUCTION
On August 3, 1977 Congress and President Jimmy Carter
enacted a set of laws that was not only vetoed twice by President
Gerald Ford' but was unwelcome by the surface mining industry
at large.2 The bill, H.R. 2, more commonly known as the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), sought to
prevent further degradation of the surface of lands and to correct
the past destruction from surface mining. Congress intended
SMCRA to cover a wide range of environmental effects of
surface mining.
4
Since Congress did not define the words "surface" or "min-
ing" in the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (here-
inafter SMCRA),5 the definition of surface mining as to its scope
* Senior staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW;
J.D., University of Kentucky, Class of 1993. B.A., Transylvania University, 1990.
John D. Edgcomb, Cooperative Federalism and Environmental Protection: The
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 58 TuL. L. REV. 299, 311 (1983).
Id. at 299-300.
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 [hereinafter cited as
SMCRA], Pub. L. No. 95-87, §§ 101-908, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328).
4 SMCRA § 101(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1988) provides:
many surface mining operations result in disturbances of surface areas that
burden and adversely affect commerce and the public welfare by destroying
or diminishing the utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential,
recreational, agricultural, and forestry purposes, by causing erosion and
landslides, by contributing to floods, by polluting the water, by destroying
fish and wildlife habitats, by impairing natural beauty, by damaging the
property of citizens, by creating hazards dangerous to life and propertyf,]
by degrading the quality of life in local communities, and by counteracting
governmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and other
natural resources.
5 SMCRA § 101(c)-908, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988).
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has been a debated issue. Considering the continual advance-
ments in mining technology and the diverse geography, topog-
raphy, and geology of the United States, surface mining may
take the form of several seemingly unrelated techniques.
When confronted with mining techniques on or below the
earth, the word "surface" requires closer scrutiny. Only a few
cases have attempted to apply SMCRA to the dredging of coal,
a form of underwater excavation. 6 Coal dredging recovers coal
that has been carried through the waterways and eventually
deposited on the bottoms of streams, rivers, or lakes.7 This
Comment reviews the surface mining definition under SMCRA
and demonstrates how coal dredging fits into that framework.
I. CuMBERLAND RECLAMATION Co. V. SECRETARY, U.S. DEPT.
OF INTERIOR
A recent case dealing with this issue was Cumberland Rec-
lamation Company v. Secretary, United States Department of
the Interior.8 Cumberland conducted a dredging operation be-
ginning in 1982 on the Cumberland River in Knox County,
Kentucky. The operation consisted of a floating barge with a
dredge pump, a device which pumps water and solid wastes
from the riverbed and separates the coal from the other ma-
terials. The excavation conducted by Cumberland's dredge did
not penetrate into the riverbed, but vacuumed tons of river
sediment. 9
In 1985, after Cumberland had been operating three years,
the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement
(OSMRE) from its field office in Lexington, Kentucky notified
Cumberland that since its facility fell within the scope of
SMCRA, the company owed reclamation fees. Cumberland
disagreed and appealed to the U.S. Department of the Interior
Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) that affirmed the OSMRE
decision. The dredging company then appealed to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky,
which affirmed the IBLA decision and assessed reclamation
I Cumberland Reclamation Co. v. Secretary, United States Dept. of Interior, 925
F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. H.G.D. & J. Mining Co., 561 F.Supp. 315
(S.D. W.Va. 1983); Brentwood, Inc., 90 I.D. 421 (1983).
Brentwood, 90 I.D. at 422-23.
Cumberland Reclamation, 925 F.2d at 164.
Id. at 165-167.
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fees,' 0 interest, and penalties of $13,338.45."
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the
case' 2 pursuant to the "substantial evidence" standard set forth
in the Administrative Procedure Act. 3 Cumberland argued on
appeal that its operation did not correspond to the definition of
surface mining under SMCRA.' 4 The reclamation fees assessed
under section 1232(a) apply only to coal operators subject to the
provisions of the Act. 5 Cumberland asserted its work was below
the surface of the water and not an activity on the surface of
the lands, and thus did not qualify as a surface mining operation
under SMCRA.
Cumberland's particular activities did not penetrate the river-
bed." The legislative history and statutory language of SMCRA,
however, along with relevant case law, cut against Cumberland's
argument.
II. APPLYING THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND
RECLAMATION ACT TO COAL DREDGING
Important in the consideration of applying SMCRA to this
set of facts is the Act's general purpose. In the statute's findings
and policy, Congress demonstrates that it considered a broad
range of environmental, social, and economic factors when it
decided to regulate surface mining. 7 The reclamation fees col-
lected under section 1232 go to the abandoned mine reclamation
fund established under 30 U.S.C 1231.11 The funds under sub-
10 SMCRA § 402(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (1988) provides:
All operators of coal mining operations subject to the provisions of this
Act shall pay to the Secretary of the Interior, for deposit in the fund, a
reclamation fee of 35 cents per ton of coal produced by surface mining
and 15 cents per ton of coal produced by underground mining or 10 per
centum of the value of the coal at the mine, as determined by the Secretary,
whichever is less, . . . (emphasis added).
Cumberland Reclamation, 925 F.2d at 165.
2 Id. at 164.
,3 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988). Generally, substantial evidence is the quality of
evidence for a court to affirm an administrative agency's decision based upon whether
a reasonable mind could come to such a conclusion.
Cumberland Reclamation, 925 F.2d at 166.
SMCRA § 402(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (1988).
" Cumberland Reclamation, 925 at 169 (the court refused affidavits concerning
this issue, but said that they would not have changed the ruling).
" SMCRA § 101, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1988).
Is SMCRA § 401(c)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1231(c)(l)(amended 1990) provides in part:
Use. Moneys in the fund may be used for the following purposes: (1) reclamation
and restoration of land and water resources adversely affected by past coal mining ....
1992-93]
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section (c) are to reclaim and restore those land and water
resources damaged by previous mining. 9 In coal dredging, even
if the activity does not upset the riverbed, resedimentation is a
result.
Congress stated its concern for water damage in the statute;
the disturbance need not be limited to hard earth damage.
20
Water quality was an important goal for Congress since no states
before 1977 conducted water sampling or hydrologic testing in
relation to the consequences of mining. 2' A comment from the
legislative history states "[tihe impact of coal mining on water
resources has been well documented. A number of studies pro-
vide insight into potential water resource impacts of min-
ing. . , 22 and "the bill sets attainable standards to protect the
hydrologic balance of impacted areas within the limits of feasi-
bility. "3
The most important statutory language relied on in Cumber-
land Reclamation is the definition of surface mining appearing
in section 1291(28).2 Broad in its scope, the language lists several
19 SMCRA § 401(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1231(c) (1988).
" SMCRA § 101(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1988); SMCRA § 401(c)(1), 30 U.S.C.
§ 1231(c)(1) (1988).
2' Edgcomb, supra note 1, at 299.
H.R. REP. No. 281, 95th, 1st. Sess., 1977, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 593,
643.
"' Id.
- SMCRA § 701(28), 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28) provides:
"'surface coal mining operations" means-
(A) activities conducted on the surface of lands in connection with a surface
coal mine or subject to the requirements of section 1266 of this title surface
operations and surface impacts incident to an underground coal mine, the
products of which enter commerce or the operations of which directly or
indirectly affect interstate commerce. Such activities include excavation for
the purpose of obtaining coal including of obtaining coal including such
common methods as contour, strip, auger, mountaintop removal, box cut,
open pit, and area mining, the uses of explosives and blasting, and in situ
distillation or retorting, leaching or other chemical or physical processing,
and the cleaning, concentrating, or other processing or preparation, loading
of coal for interstate commerce at or near the mine site: Provided, however,
That such activities do not include the extraction of coal incidental to the
extraction of other minerals where coal does not exceed 16 2/3 per centum
of the tonnage of minerals removed for purposes of commercial use or
sale or coal explorations subject to section 1262 of this title; and
(B) the areas upon which such activities occur or where such activities
disturb the natural land surface. Such areas shall also include any adjacent
land the use of which is incidental to any such activities, all lands affected
by the contruction of new roads or the improvement or use of existing
[VOL. 8:105
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mining processes. Cumberland argued since dredging is absent
from the list, Congress did not intend dredging to be regulated
as surface mining; therefore section 1232 reclamation fees would
not apply to Cumberland's type of operation. 25 Section 1291 uses
the word "including", which under statutory construction is
interpreted as illustrative, not inclusive.2 6 Hence, arguing that
the definition of surface mining is limited ignores the statutory
language. The statute broadly states that "[s]uch activities in-
clude excavation for the purpose of obtaining coal . ",27 Since
dredging is a form of excavation that occurs underwater, the
statute's broad language does not exclude this type of coal
recovery."8
SMCRA allows exemptions to certain surface mining oper-
ations. Under 30 U.S.C. 127829 and 30 U.S.C. 1291(28)(A),30 for
example, the Act specifically enumerates the activities to which
SMCRA does not apply. Two exclusions under section 1278 are
the private landowner mining for noncommercial use and the
incidental extraction of coal from federal, state, or local regu-
lated construction.31 However, Cumberland used the two acre
rule,3 2 a de minimis exception which Congress deleted in 1987,
but still applies to reclamation fees assessed before 1987.11 The
rule states that surface mining for commercial purposes affecting
roads to gain access to the site of such activities and for haulage, and
excavations, workings, impoundments, dams, ventilation shafts, entryways,
refuse banks, dumps, stockpiles, overburden piles, spoil banks, culm banks,
tailings, holes or depressions, repair areas, storage areas, processing areas,
shipping areas and other areas upon which are sited structures, faciltities,
or other property or materials on the surface, resulting from or incident
to such activities; and...
" Cumberland Reclamation, 925 F.2d at 166. The dissent agrees with this argument
of using strict statutory construction. Id. at 169.
m Brentwood, 90 I.D. at 423.
27 SMCRA § 701(28), 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28).
uId.
SMCRA § 528, 30 U.S.C. § 1278 (1988) (amended 1987) provides in full:
Surface mining operations not subject to this chapter
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any of the following activities:
(1) the extraction of coal by a landowner for his own noncommercial use from
land owned or leased by him; and
(2) the extraction of coal as an incidental part of Federal, State or local government-
financed highway or other construction under regulations established by the regulatory
authority.
- SMCRA § 701(28), 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28).
, SMCRA § 528, 30 U.S.C. § 1278 (1988).
11 Cumberland Reclamation, 925 F.2d at 167.
33 SMCRA § 528, 30 U.S.C. § 1278 (1988).
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two acres or less is exempt from SMCRA.3 4 According to the
court, Cumberland failed to carry its burden of proof to fall
under the exemption because it "never substantiated its asser-
tions. "3
The third exclusion found in the last sentence of section
1291(28)(A) deals with the incidental removal of coal during the
extraction of other minerals. If the coal does not exceed 16 2/3
0 of the total tonnage of minerals for commercial use or sale
then, for purposes of the statute, the activity is not considered
a surface mining operation.16 Cumberland %asserted it produced
88% per cent sand and 12% coal.37 Since Cumberland's affidavit
covered only volume of production and not value of sales,
Cumberland also failed to carry the burden of proof on this
exception to fees.
38
III. CASES DEALING WITH CoAL DREDGING
Two other cases have struggled with the definition of surface
mining under SMCRA and the problem of including coal dredg-
ing in that definition: United States v. H.G.D. & J. Mining
Co. 39 and Brentwood, Inc.40 In both cases, the Secretary of the
Interior deemed the dredging activities to be surface mining
operations under SMCRA.
41
A. United States v. H. G.D. & J. Mining Co.
In H.G.D. & J. Mining the court said that "the term 'surface
lands,' as used in the Act, clearly means the surface of the earth,
including the waters thereon." 42 Nevertheless, H.G.D. & J. Min-
Id.
Cumberland Reclamation, 925 F.2d 167-168. Clarification is needed because the
District Court found that "Cumberland did not substantiate its assertions by submitting
facts to the IBLA, and thus the summary proceedings by IBLA was proper." The Court
of Appeals agreed with this conclusion. Id.
SMCRA § 701(28), 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28)(A). See supra note 22 and accompa-
nying text.
Cumberland Reclamation, 925 F.2d at 167.
Id. at 168. The IBLA explained that Cumberland could have easily calculated
the amount removed for commercial sale. Id.
19 United States v. H.G.D. & J. Mining, 561 F.Supp. 315 (S.D.W.Va. 1983).
Brentwood, 90 I.D. at 421.
H.D.G. & A Mining, 561 F.Supp. at 323; Brentwood, 90 I.D. at 424.
H.G.D. & J. Mining, 561 F.Supp. at 323. This definition distinguishes surface
coal mining operations from underground mining. Id.
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ing is distinguishable from Cumberland Reclamation in the type
of dredging operations conducted. H.G.D. & J. cut into the
river bottom a depth of approximately fifteen feet and a width
of two hundred yards. 43 Cumberland asserted that its operation
did not disturb the surface of the river bottom. 44 The courts in
both cases point to the broad language in the statute's definition
of surface mining that includes related activities such as coal
processing or preparation, loading, and in situ distillation, 45
activities which do not necessarily cut into the earth's surface.
Distinguishing Cumberland's dredging from H.G.D.& J.'s
dredging thus does nothing in limiting SMCRA's definition of
surface mining.
The court in H.G.D. & J. Mining draws two further conclu-
sions on coal dredging. First, the court points out that according
to the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior,6
the coal recovered from an activity like dredging is reclaimed
coal.4 7 Reclaimed coal is not in its original deposit. Dredging
recovers coal not naturally occurring, but coal washed upstream
from loading docks, mining operations, abandoned coal mines
or exposed coal seams. 4 The regulations further state "[rieclaimed
coal operations are considered to be surface coal mining opera-
tions for fee liability and calculation purposes.'' 9
A policy reason for this stance on reclaimed coal may be to
internalize the costs to the environment.10 While the original
"1 Id. at 316. This cut in the river bottom captured the coal that escaped from
"loading or mining operations, abandoned coal mines or exposed coal seams." Id. at
316.
. Cumberland argued that their activity "does not penetrate into the natural river
bottom but only vacuums sedimentary material which lies on the river bottom." Cum-
berland Reclamation, 925 F.2d at 167.
,I ld. at 318; Cumberland Reclamation, 925 F.2d at 169; See id. at 169 (Weilford,
J. dissenting); H.G.D. & J. Mining, 561 F.Supp. at 318.
4 30 C.F.R. § 870.5 (1991); 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c)(2) gives the Secretary of the
Interior the power to enact rules and regulations that enhance the provisions of the
SMCRA.
' H.G.D. & J. Mining, 561 F.Supp. at 324.
Is Id.
40 30 C.F.R. § 870.5 (1991) provides:
Reclaimed coal means coal recovered from a deposit that is not in its
original geological location, such as refuse piles or culm banks or retaining
dams and ponds that are or have been used during the mining or prepa-
ration process, and stream coal deposits. Reclaimed coal operations are
considered to be surface mining operations for fee liability and calculation
purposes.
" Edgcomb, supra note 1, at 312. The court held, "The SMCRA places the
1992-931
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mining operator did not pay a reclamation fee on the lost coal,
environmental harm, i.e., despoiling of the lands, still occurred.
By forcing those who recover previously mined coal to pay the
lost reclamation fees, SMCRA internalizes into the market the
external benefits (selling surface mined coal with no reclamation
fees ever assessed in a market with other surface mined coal
having fees assessed) and the external costs (a damaged environ-
ment from the original excavation). Such an argument meshes
well with one of the Act's purposes discussed earlier-namely,
to correct present and past harms from mining.5'
The second analysis compares coal dredging with placer min-
ing. Both types of mining operations are similar. Placer mining
involves the use of dredges to recover heavy metals, usually gold
and tin-bearing minerals, from gravel areas in alluvial or marine
areas.52 The metals recovered are much like reclaimed coal, i.e.,
they are not in their original geological location, but were eroded
and sent upstream where they become deposited among sand
and gravel 3 The placer mining process of metal recovery is
similar to what happens to coal in the coal dredging process.
Placer mining is also established by definition as a surface min-
ing activity. The court relied on one engineering publication that
stated placer mining using dredges was a surface mining activ-
ity. 54
B. Brentwood, Inc.
Brentwood is similar to Cumberland Reclamation in the type
of dredging involved. Brentwood, Inc. had not begun mining
activities, instead, its appeal dealt with a rejection of its appli-
cation for a coal lease from the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM). 5 Brentwood sought to mine the Cumberland River and
Cumberland Lake inside the Daniel Boone National Forest with
a floating dredge and tipple operation that would not cut into
environmental and aesthetic cost of surface mining on the most deserving, the mining
industry and its customers." Id.
51 30 U.S.C. § 1231(c)(1) (1988).
H.G.D. & J. Mining, 561 F.Supp. at 321.
I d. at 320-21. See also Reynolds v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 116 U.S. 687, 695
(1986); Gregory v. Pershbaker, 14 P. 401, 402 (Cal. 1887).
Id. at 321, n.8 (relying on Society of Mining Engineers of the American Institute
of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, Inc., Surface Mining, at 4 (1st Ed.,
1968)).
" Brentwood, 90 I.D. at 422.
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the river or lake bottom.5 6 The Secretary of the Interior issues
leases allowing surface coal mining within a national forest only
upon the satisfaction of certain criteria.
57
Brentwood claimed its planned activities were not surface
mining and the process was "clean" and environmentally safe. 8
Similarly, Cumberland's operation did not disturb the river bot-
tom, yet was still considered a surface mining operation under
SMCRA.5 9 The Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) stated
that SMCRA's definition of surface mining was inclusive enough
for dredging to be within the Act's grasp.60 The Board also
quoted a Senate Report from SMCRA's legislative history that
specifically says that the Senate contemplated dredging to be a
surface mining activity .6 With clear legislative intent and statu-
tory language, the IBLA rejected Brentwood's application for a
coal mining lease in the national forest.
C. Kanawha Dredging and Minerals Co., Ltd. v. United
States
Another case, Kanawha Dredging and Minerals Co., Ltd. v.
United States, applied the Internal Revenue Code definition of
surface mining to coal dredging.62 The district court in Kanawha,
using 26 U.S.C. 4121, which imposes the Black Lung Excise Tax
on surface mining operations, decided that coal dredging, as
applied to the federal tax code, is not surface mining under that
statute. 63 The statute requires that the geological material above
the coal be completely removed. 64 In coal dredging the only
Brentwood contended that they wanted to recover coal that had been transported
by the rivers and streams and then settled on the lake's bottom. Id.
,1 Id. Leases must be approved by the Department of Agriculture. Brentwood
must also meet certain guidelines under the SMCRA and 43 C.F.R. § 3461(a)(2)(1). Id.
11 Id. The process consisted of pumping the coal to the surface, separating it from
the water, and returning it. Id.
11 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
Id. at 423-24 (relying on H.G.D. & J. Mining Co., 561 F.Supp. 315).
6, Id. at 424 (citing S. REP. No. 128, 1st Sess. 98 (1977); S.REP. No. 28, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 224 (1975); S.REP. No. 402, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1973)). Congress
used the House version of the Bill.
62 Kanawha Dredging and Minerals Co., Ltd., v. U.S., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15144 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 1, 1987). In 1985, the IRS assessed Kanawha Dredging with a
Black Lung Excise Tax, interest and penalties pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 4121 of the
Internal Revenue Code. The basis of the tax was that Kanawha Dredging participated
in a surface mining operation. Id. at 1-2.
" 26 U.S.C. § 4121 (I.R.C.) (1981).
Kanawha Dredging, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15144, at *5 (citing I.R.C. §
4121(d)(l)).
1992-931
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significant thing above the coal is water. The court also consid-
ered the nature of the activity, which does not present a mean-
ingful danger of the operation's employees contracting black
lung disease.65 The different policies operating behind the Inter-
nal Revenue Code and SMCRA help explain the divergent hold-
ing of Kanawha Dredging.
IV. RELATED APPLICATIONS OF SMCRA's DEFINITION OF
SURFACE COAL MINING
Subsequent applications of the surface mining definition un-
der SMCRA further demonstrate its breadth. The Department
of the Interior, using 30 U.S.C. §1291(28)6 and 30 C.F.R.
§870.5,67 has applied SMCRA to such things as refuse piles,
stockpiles, anthracite silt, and culm banks all that have been
deemed surface mining operations for the assessment of recla-
mation fees. The use of SMCRA in each of these activities may
help develop an understanding of SMCRA's application to coal
dredging. The following cases deal with reclaimed coal,6" the
same type of coal recovered in dredging operations such as
Cumberland's which was described earlier.
A. Refuse Piles
In United States v. Kennedy, appellant Kennedy bought
property that contained an abandoned mine, some buildings,
and a sizeable refuse or "gob" pile that was composed of
material technically classed as coal. 69 Kennedy planned to con-
struct a shopping center on the property, and decided to move
the pile away. Using standard earthmoving equipment, Kennedy
loaded the refuse into trucks without cutting into the earth and
sold the burnable material to a power company.
70
The court faced the issue of whether Kennedy's activities
constituted a surface coal mining operation as defined in section
Id. at *6.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
, See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See generally United States v. Tri-No Enterprises, Inc., 819 F.2d 154 (7th Cir.
1987); United States v. Kennedy, 806 F.2d III (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Devil's
Hole, Inc., 747 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1984); Ginter Coal Co. v. Environmental Hearing
Board, 9 Pa. Commw. 263 (1973).
1 Kennedy, 806 F.2d at 112. "Technically classed as coal" means that the sub-
stance is at least fifty percent carbonaceous matter. Id.
7 Id.
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1291(28) of SMCRA. If so, the appellant would be liable for
reclamation fees.
Under the Act, Congress authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for car-
rying out the provisions of SMCRA.7' The Secretary has stated
in the regulations that reclaimed coal operations are surface
mining; these regulations also specifically include refuse piles as
reclaimed coal.
7 2
Kennedy argued that his operation did not harm the envi-
ronment, asserting that the Secretary extended the definition of
surface mining in the regulations beyond what Congress intended
in the statute. 73 However, the court reasoned that because Con-
gress specifically allowed the Secretary to promulgate regula-
tions, then it must only be consistent with the statute's purpose.
74
Since Congress wished to correct the past effects of surface
mining on the environment, reclaimed coal cannot escape unas-
sessed. Producers and users of the coal must bear the costs, and
Kennedy's coal should not enter the market without contributing
to the coal reclamation fund. Considering the broad purpose of
SMCRA, the court held Kennedy liable for fees upon moving
and selling the refuse pile.
75
B. Stockpiles
In another case, United States v. Tri-No Enterprises, Inc.,
the court again upheld the Secretary's definition of surface min-
ing.7 6 Tri-No bought land from a coal company that contained
a large stockpile of coal and commenced removing it. The ex-
cavations of Tri-No did not disturb the surface of the land nor
was the coal treated or processed in any way.7 7 Nevertheless, the
government deemed the operation to be surface mining and
assessed reclamation fees.
Tri-No claimed that its activities were not surface mining,
78
despite the specific listing of stockpiles in section 1291(28)(B). 79
"' 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c)(2) (1988).
72 30 C.F.R. § 870.5 (1988).
73 Kennedy, 806 F.2d at 113.
7Id.
7" Id. at 114.
7- 819 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1987).
" Id. at 156.
78 Id.
See supra note 22.
1992-93]
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Tri-No also asserted that its activities caused no harm to the
environment and that removal of large piles of coal mitigates
harm to the surrounding land and begins the reclamation proc-
ess.80 The court used a similar rationale as used in Kennedy,
which stated the purpose of SMCRA was to remedy the past
harms of mining activities. Once again, the court noted the
ultimate cost of reclamation cannot be escaped and must be
borne by producers and eventually consumers."'
C. Anthracite Silt
Another case dealing with reclaimed coal in the form of
anthracite silt upheld the Secretary's broad definition of surface
mining in the regulation. In U.S. v. Devil's Hole, Inc. ,82 for
example, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard
primarily two arguments from Devil's Hole.
First, the company argued that anthracite silt is not coal,
and thus its activity is not a surface mining operation."3 Anthra-
cite silt forms when anthracite coal is washed and the mixture
of water and waste is held in silt dams. Over the years the water
evaporates, leaving behind dried anthracite silt. Devil's Hole
recovered the dried, combustible material on its property and
sold it to a power company. Relying on expert testimony, the
court decided that anthracite silt was coal.
4
Second, Devil's Hole argued the government should encour-
age environmentally desirable activity rather than assessing rec-
lamation fees. 5 Devil's Hole argued this bias for activities less
damaging to the environment was already in the statute. The fee
assessed on surface mining is thirty-five cents per ton of coal,
and the fee assessed on underground mining with surface effects
is only fifteen cents.86 Devil's Hole argued the difference arises
because surface mining has more detrimental effect on the en-
vironment than underground mining with surface effects, and
consequently surface mining pays higher fees. Based on this
Tri-No, 819 F.2d at 157.
8 Id. (In dictum, the court also recognized that the regulations and subsequent
fees may make removal of refuse piles or stockpiles, which is beneficial to the environ-
ment, unprofitable).
747 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1984).
I d. at 897.
"Id.
Id. at 898.
30 U.S.C. § 1232 (a) (1988).
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difference and the implication of an environmental rationale,
Devil's Hole asserted that since its operation was environmen-
tally desirable, it should not be assessed fees.87
The court held that the Congressional intent with regard to
the divergence in fee rates was not based on environmental
effects, but the high economic and social costs involved in un-
derground mining.8 8 With equivalent fees, coal mined under-
ground would not be competitive with coal mined from the
surface of the lands. The court further held that the Secretary
assessed these particular fees not to prevent present and future




Culm banks further demonstrate the scope of the surface
mining definition. Before the passage of SMCRA, Pennsylvania
state courts considered whether the recovery of coal from culm
banks constituted surface mining, which, if so, would require
the operation to seek a mining permit. In Ginter Coal Co. v.
Environmental Hearing Board,90 the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania, applying a state reclamation statute91 similar to
the federal SMCRA, 92 found the activity to be within the defi-
nition of surface mining. The culm banks in question were
residual waste or slack from anthracite coal mining operations
over several years. The statute specifically describes surface min-
ing to include minerals recovered from waste or stockpiles, an
activity similar to Ginter's operation. 9
Ginter also argued the policy effect of requiring permits for
the excavation of reclaimed coal, noting that the type of activity
that it conducted along with certain other surface mines has a
long-term beneficial impact on the environment. Rather than
encouraging the removal and initiating reclamation, the court
recognized the government is discouraging the recovery of culm
banks. 94 The court acknowledged the effect, but stated that it
17 Devil's Hole, 747 F.2d at 898.
" Id. at 898.
I Id.
0 Ginter, 9 Pa. Commw. 263.
52 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 1396.1-1396.21 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992).
30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1988).
Ginter, 9 Pa. Comraw. at 264.
See Id. at 267.
1992-931
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL L.
must carry out the plain language of the legislation, which was
to require permitting." Ginter's arguments failed, its operation
was considered surface mining, and it consequently had to apply
for a permit.
CONCLUSION
The definition of surface mining coal operations found in
SMCRA is broad in its scope,9 just as the purpose of SMCRA
is expansive in its concerns for the environment. 97 The language
used in the Act, "surface of the lands," arguably applies also
to the surface of waters, and if not to the surface of waters, at
least to the surface of stream, river, or lake bottoms. To correct
past harms and prevent future harms to the environment, SMCRA
must be flexible enough to apply to a wide range of mining
activities in order to accomplish its wide-reaching statutory pur-
pose.
Coal dredging cases have adopted a broad definition of
surface coal mining operation. The court in Cumberland Rec-
lamation, relying heavily on H.G.D. & J. Mining,9 and Brent-
wood,99 decided that the absence of digging or cuts into the
riverbed (no damage to the environment) was of no consequence
when deciding whether SMCRA applied.100 The test does not
seem to hinge upon the operation affecting environmental dam-
age. Instead, courts look at activities and areas listed in the
statute and apply those to coal dredging. Courts deciding the
three dredging cases also emphasized SMCRA's correction of
past mining harms, instead of the prevention of future mining
damage.
The coal recovered using dredging techniques is reclaimed
coal, which is a class of coal regulated under SMCRA10° and the
subject of several cases.'02 Under SMCRA, stockpiles, refuse
piles, anthracite silt, and culm banks are all considered surface
mining operations. Activities involved in the recovery of those
9 Id. at 268.
- 30 U.S.C. § 1291 (28) (1988).
9' 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1988).
561 F.Supp. 315.
90 I.D. 421.
Cumberland Reclamation, 925 F.2d at 167.
30 C.F.R. 870.5 (1988).
9 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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types of coal often do not upset the land. An argument has been
made that these activities are actually beneficial, and thus should
not be assessed a reclamation fee. The argument ignores the fact
that reclaimed coal was often derived from an activity damaging
to the environment in the past. Allowing reclaimed coal to escape
the assessment of fees would provide it an unfair competitive
edge in the market with coal properly assessed a fee.
The dredging of coal, even without disturbing the surface of
the lands, is just one of the sweeping range of activities falling
into SMCRA's grasp. The statutory definition of surface coal
mining, the regulatory definition of reclaimed coal, the relevant
case law, and policy arguments place coal dredging squarely
within the ambit of SMCRA.

